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NOTES

CURBING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ENTHUSIASM: AN
ARGUMENT FOR A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS TO
DISCLOSED BUT UNCLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

INTRODUCTION

The laws that make up the patent corpus attempt to balance
competing policy objectives of providing people an incentive to
create new and useful products with the need to give society the
benefits derived from a competitive marketplace. To strike this
balance, Congress created a series of formalistic rules that the
inventor must comply with to receive a patent. Recognizing, however, in the context of patent infringement that literal compliance
with formalistic rules might turn a patent into a worthless object,
courts turn to the doctrine of equivalents. The purpose of the
doctrine of equivalents is to prevent someone from making insubstantial variations to a patented invention in order to avoid literal
infringement.
Application of the doctrine of equivalents creates ambiguities as
to the exact scope of a patent. The tension between the doctrine of
equivalents and other patent doctrines such as the doctrine that
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the public,
and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel as applied to
elements of claims that have been amended during prosecution, is
a frequent topic of court opinions. Of late, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has restricted the application
of the doctrine of equivalents. In Johnson & JohnstonAssociates v.
747
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R.E. Service Co. the en banc Federal Circuit held that the doctrine
of equivalents could not be applied to find infringement as to
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.' All such subject matter is
deemed dedicated to the public.2
Part I of this Note introduces the rule of dedication to the public
and the doctrine of equivalents. Additionally, Part I provides a
brief discussion of the Supreme Court's doctrine of equivalents
jurisprudence. Part II examines two ends of a spectrum of Federal
Circuit jurisprudence regarding disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter. Part III discusses the en banc Federal Circuit's decision in
Johnson& Johnston. Part IV introduces the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel-a patent law doctrine that has posed problems
analogous to those posed by disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. This Part will also discuss the divergent approaches taken by
the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court in dealing with the
tension between the doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel as evidenced in Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.3 Finally, Part V advocates
a Festo-like rebuttable presumption against application of the
doctrine of equivalents to disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.
I. DEDICATION TO THE PUBLIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

A. Dedication to the Public
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, a patent "specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention."4 A literal reading of this provision seems to require that
all information disclosed in the specification, but absent in the
claims, is beyond the scope of the patent. Indeed, courts have
interpreted the provision in this manner, and have created what is

1.
2.
3.
4.

285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
Id. at 1054.
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
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now the "well-established rule that 'subject matter disclosed but
not claimed in a patent application is dedicated to the public.'"'
On the surface, this rule makes sense. After all, the patentee
is in the best position to know what the invention is and, consequently, the patentee should be responsible for claiming the full
scope of the invention. Failure to include some subject matter
logically could be interpreted to mean that the inventor does not
regard this subject matter as part of the invention.6 Courts thus
have frequently used this rule to prevent an accused infringer from
being found liable for literal infringement for practicing disclosed
but unclaimed subject matter
While strict application of the bright-line, per se rule that
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the public
fulfills the policy objectives of patent law during patent prosecution,' the rule does not function quite so well in situations where a
later judicial action deems subject matter outside the scope of
the patent. For instance, in situations where patent claims are
judicially invalidated as too broad, it is not fair, as an equitable
matter, to assume that all the subject matter of those claims has
been dedicated to the public. If the invalidated claims contain
patentable and unpatentable material, the patentee should not be
deemed to have dedicated the patentable material to the public
simply because the examiner failed to reject a claim in light of the
unpatentable material. In this and other situations where strict
application of the dedication to the public rule would render an
inequitable result, patentees have looked to the doctrine of equiva-

5. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Unique

Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
6. This Note ignores the fact that within two years of the issue date of the patent, a
patentee may file a reissue application pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 251, and enlarge the scope
of the patent. A reissue application prevents the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter of
the original patent from falling into the public domain. This Note is concerned with events
subsequent to the two-year window for filing a reissue application when the patentee is
powerless to recapture the unclaimed subject matter via a reissue application.
7. Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1107.

8. Patent prosecution refers to the period when the patentee and the Patent and
Trademark Office work together to place a patent application in condition for allowance as

a patent. If an application contains patentable subject matter, patent prosecution ends with
the Patent and Trademark Office issuing a U.S. patent.
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lents as a mechanism with which a court could ground a finding of
nonliteral infringement.
B. The Doctrine of Equivalents
1. An Introduction
A defendant may infringe a patent either literally or via the
doctrine of equivalents. "Literal infringement occurs when every
element of the claim, as construed by the court, is found exactly in
the accused device."9 When an accused device does not literally
infringe a patent, the courts may find the accused infringer to have
infringed a patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents is a judicially created equitable
doctrine meant to ensure that a patent actually provides the patent
holder a valuable property right. This doctrine provides that "a
product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express
terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if
there is 'equivalence' between the elements of the accused product
or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention."' °
This doctrine provides the patent holder with a scope of protection
extending beyond the literal terms of the patent claim. Despite the
notion that "the claims ... provide the measure of the patentee's

right to exclude,"" there are sound policy justifications for the
doctrine of equivalents. As Justice Harlan noted in Graver Tank &
ManufacturingCo. v. Linde Air Products Co.:
[T]o permit imitation of a patented invention which does not
copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of
the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limita-

tion would leave room for-indeed encourage-the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes
and substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing,
9. Scott R. Boalick, Note, The Dedication Rule and the Doctrine of Equivalents: A
ProposalforReconciliation,87 GEO. L.J. 2363,2369 (1999) (citing Stiftungv. Renishaw PLC,
945 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
10. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
11. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(per curiam).
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would be enough to take the copied12matter outside the claim,
and hence outside the reach of law.
This rationale is the foundation upon which the Supreme Court has
predicated subsequent decisions reaffirming the doctrine of equivalents.
2. A BriefHistory of the Supreme Court's Doctrine of Equivalents Jurisprudence
a. Winans v. Denmead
The case of Winans v. Denmead3 provided the Supreme Court
the forum, for the first time, to endorse the doctrine of equivalents.
Winans involved a patent for the improvement of railroad cars
carrying coal.' 4 Under the terms of the patent, the railroad car
would have a cylindrical upper-part and a conical lower-part.15 The
patentee's redesign allowed for a substantial increase in the load
the railroad cars were capable of carrying. 6 The defendants made
cars that were octagonal rather than circular, and the evidence
showed that despite the different shape, defendants' cars were
practically the same as patentee's. 7 Justice Curtis, writing for a
majority of five justices, stated that "when a patentee describes a
machine," he claims "not only the precise forms he has described,
but all other forms which embody his invention."" When someone
copies "the principle or mode of operation described, [it] is an
infringement, although such copy should be totally unlike the
original in form or proportions."' 9 The Court remanded the case,
holding that the lower court erred in not allowing the jury to
12. 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
13. 56 U.S. (1 How.) 330 (1854).
14. Id. at 330.
15. Id. at 339.
16. See id. at 340. The patentee's specification stated: "Experience has shown that cars,
on the old mode of construction, cannot be made to carry a load greater than its own weight;
but, by my improvement, I am enabled to make cars ... which will transport double their own
weight of coal." Id.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 342.
19. Id.
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determine whether the defendants copied the patentee's railroad
20
cars.

The dissent in Winans was critical of the majority's reasoning.
Justice Campbell thought the majority's decision was untethered to
the demands of Congress. 2 ' Campbell noted that the patentee
must "describe his invention, in such full, clear, and exact terms,
that from the description, the invention may be constructed and
used."2 2 Only "preciseness ] and particularity, in the description
of the invention, its principle, and of the matter claimed to be
invented, will... fulfil the demands of Congress or the wants of the

country."' The majority's opinion left Justice Campbell wondering
whether the Court could determine the exact scope of the patentee's patent. 24 Believing that the Court blurred the notice function
the patent traditionally served, Justice Campbell thought the
defendants presented the more compelling argument because
nothing in the specification or the claims of the patent disclosed the
cars that were made by the defendants.25
Following the passage of the Patent Act of 1870, the Supreme
Court "placed more emphasis on the patent claim language as the
boundary of the patent monopoly." 2 Yet, this new emphasis on the
language of the claims did not vitiate the role of the doctrine.27 For
approximately the next one hundred years, the doctrine of equivalents "survived as a tool of interpretation,"2 ' and the Supreme
Court in 1950 reaffirmed it as a viable doctrine in the GraverTank
decision.29

20. Id. at 344.
21. Id. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Id.

24. Id. ("The claim of [today] is, that an octagonal car is an infringement of this patent.
Will this be the limit to that claim?").

25. Id. at 348.
26. Boalick, supra note 9, at 2374.
27. See id.
28. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND
INFRINGEMENT § 18.02(2), at 17-18 (2003).

29. See 5A CHISUM, supra note 28, § 18.02(2), at 18-25; Boalick, supra note 9, at 2374.
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b. Graver Tank
Graver Tank was a patent infringement action relating to an
electric-welding process and the fluxes used in that process. 30
According to the patent before the Court, the patentee claimed
fluxes containing calcium and magnesium silicates, both of which
were silicates of an alkaline earth metal.3 " The alleged infringer
used a similar flux but substituted calcium and manganese silicates (manganese is not an alkaline earth metal) for the calcium
and magnesium silicates.3 2 The patentee originally included claims
covering manganese silicate, but the Court, in a prior action, found
these claims "too broad to be valid."3 To find infringement, then,
the Court had to rely on the doctrine of equivalents.
Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson noted that since the
Court's decision in Winans, the doctrine of equivalents "has been
consistently applied by this Court and the lower federal courts, and
continues today ready and available for utilization when the proper
circumstances for its application arise.""' The Court noted that
"[eiquivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula
and is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum." 5 The Court
in Graver Tank posed the question of "whether the substitution of
the manganese which is not an alkaline earth metal for the magnesium which is, under the circumstances of this case, and in view of
the technology and the prior art, is a change of such substance as
to make the doctrine of equivalents inapplicable." 8 The Court went
on to hold that the substitution was one to which the doctrine of
equivalents applied, and thus the use of the flux infringed the
patent.37 The majority, in fact, was so confident about its decision
that it thought this to be a prototypical case for application of the
doctrine of equivalents.'

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 606 (1950).
Id. at 610.
Id.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 610.
See id. at 612.
Id.
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Besides reinvigorating the doctrine of equivalents, the Graver
Tank Court reaffirmed the test for infringement enunciated in
SanitaryRefrigeratorCo. v. Winters,3 9 that "a patentee may invoke
[the doctrine of equivalents] to proceed against the producer of a
device 'if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result." 0 The basis for this
so-called "triple identity" test is the theory that "if two devices do
the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish
substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they
differ in name, form, or shape." x The Graver Tank Court endorsed
this test in an attempt to alleviate confusion as to whether the
doctrine of equivalents was valid and as to what the proper test
was for finding infringement under the doctrine. Despite this
attempt, much ambiguity remained as to the nature and scope of
the doctrine, which prompted the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in
Warner-JenkinsonCo. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.42

c. Warner-Jenkinson
Warner-Jenkinson presented the Supreme Court with another
opportunity to jump into the fray over the proper place for the
doctrine of equivalents in modern patent law. In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court noted the confusion surrounding the
doctrine of equivalents and thought that it was time to clarify the
scope of the doctrine.' The Court was keenly aware that by taking
the case it had the opportunity to eliminate the doctrine of equivalents." Ultimately, the Court decided to retain the doctrine.'
The dispute in Warner-Jenkinsoncentered on the pH range used
in ultrafiltration purification processes. Hilton Davis owned U.S.
Patent No. 4,560,746," which claims its ultrafiltration process "at

39. 280 U.S. 30 (1929).
40. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S.
30, 42 (1929)).
41. Id. (quoting Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).
42. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).

43. Id. at 21.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. U.S. Patent No. 4,560,746 (issued Dec. 24, 1985).
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a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0. " This phrase was added
during prosecution to get around a prior art reference disclosing an
ultrafiltration process utilizing a pH greater than 9.0. 4 WarnerJenkinson operated its own ultrafiltration process, but it operated
at a pH of 5.0."' Hilton Davis sued Warner-Jenkinson for patent
infringement.50 The key to resolving the dispute was determining
why Hilton Davis claimed a low-end pH of 6.0. The parties offered
sharply different reasons for the low-end limit.51 At trial, Hilton
Davis conceded that Warner-Jenkinson had not infringed its patent
literally.52 Hilton Davis thus relied on the doctrine of equivalents in
asserting its infringement claim, a strategy that was successful at
the trial court level and affirmed on appeal.53
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court recognized that the
doctrine of equivalents exists in tension with the notice function of
patent claims." To preserve both the doctrine of equivalents and
the traditional notice function patent claims serve, the Court
noted that a systematic approach to application of the doctrine of
equivalents was necessary. Because "[elach element contained in
a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the
patented invention ... the doctrine of equivalents must be applied

to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a
whole."55 When applying the doctrine of equivalents to an individual element of a claim, a court must take care to ensure that the
doctrine is not used in such a manner that an element is eliminated from the claim.56 Careful application, then, of the doctrine to
the individual elements will preserve the central functions of the
patent claims.5 7 Having articulated these principles, the Supreme
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 22.
Id at 23.
Id.

51. See id. at 22 n.2.
52. Id. at 23.

53. Id.
54. See id. at 29 ("There can be no denying that the doctrine ofequivalents, when applied
broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming
requirement.").

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 30. One of the most important functions of patent claims is to provide the public
with notice as to the boundary of the patent. Id. at 29. In other words, the patent claims tell

756

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 45:747

Court explicitly adhered to the doctrine of equivalents, but remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for a determination of
matters consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion."
Clearly, the doctrine of equivalents survived after WarnerJenkinson, but as much as the Court tried to clarify the role and
scope of the doctrine, much about how to apply the doctrine remains unclear. The Court, for instance, has never specifically
addressed the question of whether the doctrine applies to material
disclosed in the specification but left unclaimed. The closest the
Court has come to definitively answering this question came in
Graver Tank, when the Court found equivalence for subject matter
in claims that were later invalidated as being overly broad.59
Without clear guidelines from the Supreme Court, the federal
courts and, since its adoption in 1982, the Federal Circuit,6 ° have
been left to their own devices in determining when to apply the
doctrine of equivalents, if at all, in situations where the patentee
disclosed but left unclaimed disputed subject matter. In so doing,
the courts, and particularly the Federal Circuit, have created a
hodgepodge of precedent, where the make-up of a particular
Federal Circuit panel seems to explain the decisions more so than
any other reason. 6 '
II. Two ENDS OF A SPECTRUM
A. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.
At one end of the spectrum of Federal Circuit cases dealing with
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter is the 1996 decision
Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc. 2 Maxwell's patent was for a system of
fastening two shoes together.' In the specification, the patentee
the public what is covered by the patent and what is not.
58. Id. at 40-41.
59. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 616 (1950).
60. Per 28 U.S.C. § 1295, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals involving patents. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2002).
61. See Boalick, supra note 9, at 2386 ("The wandering path taken by these decisions is
as easily explained by differences in the ideologies of the judges who made up the individual
panels as anything else.*).
62. 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
63. Id. at 1101.
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disclosed two alternative methods for fastening the shoes. The first
involved a fastening tab that "extends around the edge of the inner
sole of the shoe and vertically upwardly along the inside surface of
the upper body of the shoe, but spaced therefrom."" Alternatively,
the fastening tabs "may be stitched into a lining seam of the shoes
at the sides or back of the shoes." 5 Maxwell, however, claimed only
the first of the two alternatives."6 When Maxwell discovered J.
Baker selling the unclaimed alternative, she sued J. Baker for
patent infringement.
In deciding the case, the Federal Circuit distinguished Graver
Tank."7 The Federal Circuit noted that in GraverTank the patentee
originally claimed the disputed subject matter, and the only reason
Graver Tank did not literally infringe Linde Air Products' patent
was because the claims covering the disputed subject matter were
judicially invalidated.68 The fact that the patentee in Graver Tank
originally claimed the disputed subject matter was an important
factor for the Federal Circuit in determining the issue of dedication
to the public. As the Federal Circuit noted with regard to Graver
Tank:
[Bly filing claims in the patent application that encompassed a
welding composition containing metal silicates, including manganese silicates as disclosed in the specification, the patentee
[in Graver Tank] could not be said to have dedicated such an
embodiment of the invention to the public, even if the broad
claims encompassing the embodiment were later held invalid. 9
Because Maxwell failed to claim both alternatives, the unclaimed
method was dedicated to the public. The doctrine of equivalents
was unavailable to Maxwell because the Patent and Trademark
Office did not consider the patentability of the unclaimed alternative.70 As a result, the Federal Circuit relied on the traditional rule

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

U.S. Patent No. 4,624,060 (issued Nov. 25, 1986).
Id.
Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1108.
Id. at 1107.
See id.
Id. at 1107-08.
Id. at 1108.
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that disclosed but unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the
public.71
Maxwell was a relatively easy case for the Federal Circuit. There
was no question that the two alternatives of the shoe-fastening
system were distinct. To accept Maxwell's theory that the doctrine
of equivalents could reach the distinct unclaimed embodiment, the
court would have to "ignore the claim limitations that require the
[fastening] tabs to be separate from and extend along the shoe
upper, which includes the shoe lining."72 In other words, for the
Federal Circuit to have found infringement via the doctrine of
equivalents, the court would have had to read material elements
out of the claim. The Maxwell court was unwilling to do this,
particularly because it would encourage a patentee to "narrowly
claim his invention and then, in the course of an infringement suit,
argue that the doctrine of equivalents should permit a finding of
infringement because the specification discloses the equivalents.""3
Such an action would violate the notice function served by the
claims. In Maxwell, then, the Federal Circuit panel had no difficulty deciding that the doctrine of equivalents could not reach the
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter, and that the unclaimed
subject matter was dedicated to the public.
B. YBM Magnex, Inc. v. International Trade Commission
Nearly two years later, in YBM Magnex, Inc. v. International
Trade Commission,7 ' a different Federal Circuit panel reached a
conclusion seemingly in contradiction with Maxwell.
YBM Magnex claimed as its invention in U.S. Patent No.
4,588,439 "[a] permanent magnet alloy consisting essentially of ...
6,000 to 35,000 ppm [parts per million) oxygen. "" The alleged
infringer produced magnets with an oxygen content that ranged
from between 5,450 and 6,000 ppm.76 In a proceeding before the
International Trade Commission (ITC), the Administrative Law
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 1107.
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1107.
145 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1318.
See id. at 1319.
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Judge (ALJ) "found that magnet alloys having an oxygen content
between 5,450 ppm and 6,000 ppm infringed [YBM Magnex's
patent] under the doctrine of equivalents."" In view of the ALJ's
findings, YBM Magnex filed an enforcement complaint.7 8 While this
action was pending, the Federal Circuit decided Maxwell.79 According to the ITC's interpretation ofMaxwell, Maxwell established the
principle that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be applied to reach
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.'"As such, the ITC held
that there can be no infringement, either literal or under the
doctrine of equivalents, of YBM Magnex's patent for magnets
containing an oxygen content below 6,000 ppm.81
YBM Magnex appealed the ITC's decision to the Federal Circuit,
arguing that the ITC's interpretation of Maxwell directly conflicted
with both Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent.8 2 In
reversing the ITC's decision, the Federal Circuit agreed with
YBM Magnex's arguments. According to the Federal Circuit, the
Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinsonrejected the proposition that
disclosed but unclaimed subject matter is per se dedicated to the
public.8 " In so holding, the Supreme Court "necessarily recognized
that equivalents may ... be disclosed in the patent."' Maxwell,
then, could not be interpreted as meaning that all disclosed but
unclaimed subject matter was dedicated to the public, because to
do so would place Maxwell in conflict with Warner-Jenkinson.
As to its own precedent, the Federal Circuit was well aware that
it was all over the map. In support of YBM Magnex's position,
Judge Newman, writing for the Federal Circuit in YBM Magnex,
stated that equivalency has been found for disclosed but unclaimed
subject matter in a variety of different circumstances.85 For instance, the Federal Circuit found equivalency in cases where "the
patentee had sought broader claims based on a broader disclosure

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1320.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
See id.
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but had not obtained them." 6 Additionally, in some situations the
patentee "had sought and obtained claims that were narrower than
the description in the specification, and obtained relief under the
doctrine of equivalents."87 Finally, in some situations where the
specification taught that an unclaimed embodiment was interchangeable with a claimed embodiment, "relief under the doctrine
of equivalents was not 8denied
as applying to subject matter dis8
closed but not claimed."

Judge Newman was also aware that the Federal Circuit had
held, prior to Maxwell, that disclosed but unclaimed subject matter
was deemed dedicated to the public.8 9 In support of this proposition, Judge Newman noted that the Federal Circuit in Unique
Concepts, Inc. v. Brown" held that disclosure of an alternative
embodiment without claiming it was evidence of the patentee's
intention to abandon or disclaim that embodiment. 9 ' The doctrine
of equivalents, thus, would be inapplicable where the patentee
displayed this type of intent.
As to the overall state of the law of equivalency, Judge Newman
noted that equivalency is inherently a fact-specific inquiry where
the evidence in a particular case sometimes warrants a finding of
equivalency and sometimes the evidence does not. 9 The purpose of
a court in adjudicating these types of disputes is to avoid having
insubstantial changes to the patented invention cause a fraud on
the patent.93 Because the fact-specific adjudications had created
two seemingly contradictory lines of precedent, the en banc Federal
Circuit seized the opportunity Johnson & Johnston presented the
court to clarify its position on disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter vis-A-vis the doctrine of equivalents. The result of the en
banc court's foray into this problem was a heavily fractured court

86. Id. (citing Modine Mfg. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Cole
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
87. Id. (citing Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
88. Id. (citing Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
89. See id.
90. 939 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
91. YBMMagnex, Inc., 145 F.3d at 1321.
92. Id. at 1322.
93. Id.
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in which there were four concurring opinions and one dissenting
opinion.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S EN BANC DECISION OF
JOHNSON & JOHNSTON

A. Background
This case reached the Federal Circuit after Johnson & Johnston
asserted that R.E. Service Company (R.E. Service) infringed U.S.
Patent No. 5,153,050 (the '050 patent), which it owned.94 The '050
patent related to the manufacture of multilayered printed circuit
boards.95 Traditionally, manufacture of the printed circuit boards
required workers to "manually handle ... thin sheets of copper foil
during the layering process,' and, before the invention at issue,
such handling caused irregularities or even damage to the copper
sheets." The purpose of the invention Johnson & Johnston patented was to "provide means for better foil handling, not only to
prevent folds or wrinkles, but to maintain cleanliness. " To accomplish this goal, Johnson & Johnston created a system whereby the
copper foil would adhere to a substrate, this substrate-foil system
would be incorporated into the portion of the normal manufacturing process where the foil traditionally was handled manually, and
afterward the substrate would be removed and recycled.99 At issue
in this case was the material comprising the substrate.
The '050 patent specification disclosed aluminum as the preferred substrate material."' In addition, the specification taught
that "[wihile aluminum is currently the preferred material for
the substrate, other metals, such as stainless steel or nickel
alloys, may be used."'' Johnson & Johnston, however, claimed only

94. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(per curiam).
95. See U.S. Patent No. 5,153,050 (issued Oct. 6, 1992).
96. Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1049.
97. Id.
98. U.S. Patent No. 5,153,050 (issued Oct. 6, 1992).
99. See Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1049.
100. U.S. Patent No. 5,153,050 (issued Oct. 6, 1992).
101. Id.
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aluminum as its substrate material. 1 2 R.E. Service, in 1997, began
using a substrate-foil system for manufacturing multilayered
printed circuit boards, and it used steel, rather than aluminum, as
its substrate material. 0 3 After learning of R.E. Service's system,
Johnson & Johnston filed suit alleging infringement of the '050

patent.104
At trial, the district court adjudicated the dispute on both literal
infringement and infringement via the doctrine of equivalents
grounds.' 5 The district court quickly disposed of the literal infringement issue by granting R.E. Service's motion for summary
0 The issue as to infringement
judgment of no literal infringement.1
via the doctrine of equivalents was not so clear. R.E. Service relied
on the Federal Circuit's Maxwell decision in arguing that use of
steel as a substrate material was dedicated to the public.' 7 Johnson & Johnston, in contrast, relied on YBM Magnex in asserting
that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was still
available even though the steel substrate had been disclosed but
not claimed." 8 The district court found that Johnson & Johnston
did not dedicate the steel substrate to the public, and a jury found
that R.E. Service had infringed the patent willfully under the
doctrine of equivalents and awarded Johnson & Johnston over
$1,000,000 in damages."° The issue on appeal, then, was whether
110
Maxwell or YBM Magnex controlled the disposition of this case.
B. The Per CuriamDecision and Its Meaning
In its per curiam opinion, the Federal Circuit began its analysis
by stating the rule that the claims delineate the scope of protection
for an invention."' The fact that the claims define the scope of
protection is important because they "give notice both to the
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id.
Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1050.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1050-51.
Id.
Id. at 1052.
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examiner at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution, and to the public at large, including potential competitors,
after the patent has issued."112 To determine infringement then, it
is the claims, rather than the specification, that the courts construe.11
With this perspective in mind, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its
holding in Maxwell, and overruled YBM Magnex to the extent that
it conflicted with Maxwell.11 By overruling YBM Magnex, the
Federal Circuit made explicit that "when a patent drafter discloses
but declines to claim subject matter ... this action dedicates that

unclaimed subject matter to the public." 5 Because Johnson &
Johnston disclosed but did not claim steel as a substrate material,
Johnson & Johnston dedicated steel substrates to the public, and
use the doctrine of equivalents to recapture that subject
could not
116
matter.
Taken literally, the holding of Johnson & Johnston seems to
indicate that it is the intent of the patent drafter that determines
whether disclosed but unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the
public. As defined in the dictionary, the word "decline" means "[t]o
express polite refusal."" 7 In order to express polite refusal (to
decline), an affirmative act is necessary. The Federal Circuit's
holding in Johnson & Johnston,then, could be interpreted to mean
that only when there is an affirmative declaration by the patent
drafter that unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the public is
unclaimed subject matter actually dedicated to the public. Under
the Federal Circuit's reading of the rule, however, the intent of the
patent drafter is irrelevant." 8 This interpretation seems to create
a per se rule that all disclosed but unclaimed subject matter is
dedicated to the public. Yet, if Johnson & Johnston is read to erect
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 1054-55.
115. Id. at 1054.
116. See id. at 1055.
117. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 360 (3d ed. 1997). Or, more bluntly,
"to withhold consent." THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 201 (5th ed. 1994).
118. The court held: [O]ne of the advantages of the Maxwell rule is that it is a purely
objective test. The patentee's subjective intent is irrelevant to determining whether
unclaimed subject matter has been disclosed and therefore dedicated to the public." Johnson
& Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1054 n.1.
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such a per se rule, then Johnson & Johnston would conflict with
Graver Tank because in Graver Tank the Supreme Court found
infringement for use of the disclosed but unclaimed manganese
silicate under the doctrine of equivalents.119 Implicit in this holding
is that the manganese silicate had not been dedicated to the public.
To circumvent this problem, the Federal Circuit focused on the
fact that in Graver Tank the patentee had originally claimed the
subject matter and had its patent issue with these claims. 120 By
having the patent issue with claims covering manganese silicate,
the patentee could not be said to have failed to claim subject matter
disclosed in the specification, which left the doctrine of equivalents
available to the patentee when those claims were later judicially
invalidated. As such, when patent claims are invalidated, the
subject matter of those claims is not automatically deemed dedicated to the public. Instead, courts are free to apply the traditional
doctrine of equivalents analysis, specifically that "equivalency must
be determined against the context of the patent, the prior art, and
the particular circumstances of the case,"' 2 ' to determine infringement involving the subject matter of those invalidated claims.
Accordingly, the broadest rule of Johnson & Johnston would be:
except for the subject matter of invalidated claims, all disclosed but
unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the public. A narrower
interpretation of GraverTank's holding would limit the availability
of invalidated claim subject matter only to those claims that were
invalidated as overly broad, essentially limiting the holding to the
facts of Graver Tank. Such an interpretation would further limit
the scope of the exception to the holding of Johnson & Johnston.
C. The ConcurringOpinions
Concurring opinions to the Federal Circuit's per curiam opinion
illustrated unease by some members of the court over the Johnson
& Johnston decision. 11 2 This unease was a product of how the
holding of the per curiam decision could be read as being incompatible with GraverTank. Two of the four concurring opinions focused
119.
120.
121.
122.

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950).
Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1053.
Graver Tank, 939 U.S. at 609.
See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1055-56 (Clevenger, J., concurring).
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on reconciling Johnson & Johnston with Graver Tank. Judge
Clevenger, for instance, viewed Johnson & Johnston merely as an
opportunity to "ensure uniformity in the application of our precedent" and to resolve a "perceived conflict between Judge Lourie's
opinion for the court in Maxwell, and Judge Newman's opinion for
the court in [YBM Magnex]." 23 Since all the Federal Circuit was
doing in Johnson & Johnston, then, was clarifying its own precedent, it would be incorrect to classify Johnson & Johnston as "a
mutinous act in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in
[Graver Tank] .124

Judge Dyk too felt the need to defend the Federal Circuit's
decision. The sole purpose of his concurring opinion was to emphasize why the Federal Circuit's decision was consistent with Graver
Tank.'25 According to Judge Dyk, because of factual differences
between Graver Tank and both Johnson & Johnston and Maxwell,
the Federal Circuit cases are consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. 26 Judge Dyk argued that in Graver Tank, the "specification made reference to the possible use of manganese, but it was
not clear that the specification actually disclosed that manganese
silicate (or the particular combination reflected in the infringing
material) worked for its intended purpose."'27 In both Maxwell and
Johnson & Johnston, however, there were "clear disclosures,"
which made them factually different from Graver Tank. 2 ' Because
Graver Tank was not decided in light of a clear disclosure, then,
Maxwell and Johnson & Johnston could be consistent with Graver
Tank.
Judge Dyk also argued that the issue of dedication of disclosed
but unclaimed subject matter was not properly before the Court in
Graver Tank.'29 The crux of this argument rested on the patentee's
contention that the issue of dedication to the public had not been
raised properly in the court below. 130 From this, and the fact that
it was the patentee that "argued that the patent disclosed the
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1055-56 (Dyk, J., concurring).
Id. at 1059.
See id. at 1060-61.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
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equivalent subject matter," which was a "reversal of the expected
positions of the parties," Judge Dyk argued that it was likely that
the Supreme Court "concluded that the issue of specification
disclosure had not been sufficiently raised by the alleged infringer
as a ground for rejecting the doctrine of equivalents."1"' Because
the question was not before the Graver Tank Court, there was no
controlling
precedent on this issue that bound the Federal
2
Circuit.

13

In the remaining two concurring opinions, Judges Rader and
Lourie sparred with each other over an alternative line of reasoning for the Federal Circuit's decision: a foreseeability bar.
Advanced by Judge Rader, the foreseeabiity bar would prevent
the "capture [of] subject matter that the patent drafter reasonably
could have foreseen during the application process and included in
the claims."' ss The primary benefits of this foreseeability bar,

according to Judge Rader, were that it would "enhance ] the notice
function of claims by making them the sole definition of invention
scope in all foreseeable circumstances" and would "protect 0 patentees against copyists who employ insubstantial variations to
expropriate the claimed invention in some unforeseeable circumstances."134 Foreseeability, therefore, created an objective standard
5
for determining the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents.1
Judge Lourie argued that Judge Rader's foreseeability bar would
not make doctrine of equivalents issues any easier. "Determining
what is foreseeable would often require expert testimony as to
what one skilled in the art would have foreseen. " 13

Use of a

foreseeability bar, moreover, would run the risk of making an
already complex and technical area of the law even more complex
and difficult. 137 After all, "[wihat is foreseeable is quite different
from what is disclosed in the patent. " 138 All of this led Judge Lourie

to conclude that use of a foreseeability bar was not the answer to
the questions posed in cases such as Johnson & Johnston.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1063.
133. Id. at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1057 (Clevenger, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 1063 (Lourie, J., concurring).
137. See id.
138. Id.
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D. The Dissent
Writing a scathing dissent, Judge Newman characterized the
Federal Circuit's decision as establishing a "new absolute bar to
equivalency." 3 9 In so doing, according to Judge Newman, the
court "overrule[d] not only its own decisions but also those of the
Supreme Court, and reache[d] out to create a new, unnecessary
and often unjust, per se rule."1'0 Moreover, she even argued, though
this rule may be easy to apply, it does not represent sound policy."
Judge Newman characterized the per curiam opinion as being
in "egregious" 112 conflict with Graver Tank and chided her colleagues for deriving "various gambits" to distinguish Graver
Tank.'" For instance, Judge Newman noted that the per curiam
opinion "proposes that the inclusion of [disclosed subject matter] in
invalid claims was critical to the decision in Graver Tank, although
neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions mentioned it."""'
This meant the Federal Circuit had to take "the curious position
that the inclusion of disclosed subject matter in invalid claims
renders the subject matter available for equivalency, but that
otherwise subject matter is barred from equivalency. That is not, of
course, the holding of Graver Tank.' In Judge Newman's mind,
GraverTank created binding precedent that precluded an absolute
bar to equivalency.' The role of the Federal Circuit is to apply
faithfully the Supreme Court's precedent."" By failing to apply
faithfully the precedent created by Graver Tank, the Federal
Circuit's decision in Johnson & Johnston was improper.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1064 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1066.
Id.
Id.
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IV. FESTO AND THE SUPREME COURT'S RESOLUTION OF AN ANALOGOUS PROBLEM-APPLICATION OF PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL

This Part will examine how the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court dealt with the tension between the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents through the lens of
the litigation between Festo Corporation and Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Company Before, however, any in-depth discussion of this litigation and how the Supreme Court's analysis in this
case is applicable to Johnson & Johnston-type disputes, a brief
discussion of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is in
order.
A. Background of ProsecutionHistory Estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel is another example of a patent law
doctrine that traditionally has created problems for courts. The
basic premise of the doctrine is that "[aictions by the patentee,
including claim amendments and arguments made before the
Patent Office, may give rise to prosecution history estoppel."'49
These actions create "a record that fairly notifies the public that
the patentee has surrendered the right to claim particular matter
as within the reach of the patent.""5 When there is a finding of
prosecution history estoppel to particular subject matter, the
doctrine of equivalents cannot be used as a basis for infringement
for that subject matter. In this way, prosecution history estoppel
"prevents the doctrine of equivalents from vitiating the notice
function of claims."'51
Application of prosecution history estoppel is easy when it is
clear that the contested subject matter has been surrendered for
the purpose of obtaining a patent. As the Supreme Court noted in
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.:
Where the original application once embraced the purported
equivalent but the patentee narrowed his claims to obtain the
149. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558,564 (Fed. Cir.
2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
150. Id. at 565.
151. Id. at 564 (citations omitted).

20031

CURBING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ENTHUSIASM

769

patent or to protect its validity, the patentee cannot assert that
he lacked the words to describe the subject matter in question....
In that instance the prosecution history has established that the
inventor turned his attention to the subject matter in question,
knew the words for both the broader and narrower claim, and
affirmatively chose the latter.152
Not all amendments made to claims during prosecution are to
circumvent the prior art, however. In addressing the issue of
whether prosecution history estoppel applies to amendments made
for reasons unrelated to novelty and nonobviousness patentability
issues, courts have split. Festo presented the Supreme Court with
an opportunity to resolve this split and clarify the rules for applying prosecution history estoppel.
B. Festo and the Federal Circuit
Festo gave the en banc Federal Circuit an opportunity to reassess
how prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents
are to be applied in light of the Supreme Court's Warner-Jenkinson
decision. The actual dispute in Festo became, in effect, a peripheral
matter as the Federal Circuit used the opportunity to lay down its
view of the role the doctrine of equivalents played in situations
where an amended claim gave rise to prosecution history estoppel.
Prior to rendering its decision in Festo, the Federal Circuit asked
both parties to brief five questions relating to when prosecution
history estoppel arises, and whether after it arises, to assess if and
how the doctrine of equivalents applies.' The Federal Circuit's
disposition of the first three questions (the only questions discussed
in this Note) later became of interest to the Supreme Court.
First, the Federal Circuit queried what claim amendments
created prosecution history estoppel.1 5' Specifically, the Federal
Circuit wanted to know what types of claim amendments fairly
could be said to have been made for a substantial reason related to

152. 535 U.S. 722, 734-35 (2002).
153. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 563.
154. See id.
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patentability."~ The real issue was how to determine which claim
amendments affect patentability. In other words, do patentability
issues arise only with claim amendments made to overcome rejections based on those statutory provisions that relate to novelty or
obviousness (sections 101, 102, and 103 of the Patent Act), or do
patentability issues arise for any claim amendment made for "any
reason affecting the issuance of the patent?""s The answer, according to the Federal Circuit, was:
[A] "substantial reason related to patentability" is not limited to
overcoming or avoiding prior art, but instead includes any
reason which relates to the statutory requirements for a patent.
Therefore, a narrowing amendment made for any reason related to the statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to
prosecution
history estoppel with respect to the amended claim
15 7
element.

Under the Federal Circuit's approach, any narrowing amendment
made in response to a statutory rejection would give rise to prosecution history estoppel. Left unanswered by the Federal Circuit's
first question was whether this rule applied to narrowing amendments the patentee made voluntarily. This was the subject of the
Federal Circuit's second question.' 58

"Under Warner-Jenkinson,"inquired the Federal Circuit, "should
a 'voluntary' claim amendment--one not required by the examiner
or made in response to a rejection by an examiner for a stated
reason--create prosecution history estoppel?" 9 To this, the
Federal Circuit answered: "Voluntary claim amendments are treated the same as other amendments. Therefore, a voluntary amendment that narrows the scope of a claim for a reason related to the
statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution
155. Id. In Warner-Jenkinson,the Court intimated that unless the patentee can provide
an explanation for why a particular claim amendment was not made for patentability
reasons, "the court should presume that the patent applicant had a substantial reason
related to patentability for including the limiting element added by amendment. In those
circumstances, prosecution history estoppel would bar the application of the doctrine of
equivalents." Warner.Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997).
156. Festo, 234 F.3d at 563.
157. Id. at 566.
158. See id. at 563.
159. Id.
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history estoppel as to the amended claim element."" 6° This answer
makes logical sense. "There is no reason why prosecution history
estoppel should arise if the Patent Office rejects a claim because it
believes the claim to be unpatentable, but not arise if the applicant
amends a claim because he believes the claim to be unpatentable."' 6 '
The Federal Circuit's disposition of these first two questions did
not arouse much controversy among the members of the court. In
fact, only one member of the court dissented." 2 This display of
cohesiveness among the members of the Federal Circuit evaporated
as it considered whether the doctrine of equivalents is available to
a patent owner for claims that have been amended for reasons
relating to the statutory provisions of the Patent Act.
After disposing of the question of when prosecution history
estoppel arises, the Federal Circuit asked: "If a claim amendment
creates prosecution history estoppel, under Warner-Jenkinsonwhat
range of equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine of
equivalents for the claim element so amended?"'" The majority's
answer, from which four judges dissented, was: "When a claim
amendment creates prosecution history estoppel with regard to a
claim element, there is no range of equivalents available for the
amended claim element. Application of the doctrine of equivalents
to the claim element is completely barred (a 'complete bar')." ' In
answering the question this way, the majority overturned nearly
twenty years' worth of cases in which the court applied a flexible
bar rather than a complete bar. Mindful of this result, and the fact
that binding precedent is not to be lightly disregarded,' the
majority justified its approach by declaring that "the current state

160. Id. at 568.
161. Id.
162. In her dissent, Judge Pauline Newman argued that the majority's definition of
"reasons related to patentability" was "inappropriately broad." Id. at 630 (Newman, J.,
dissenting). According to Judge Newman, the Supreme Court has recognized that "not every
rejection based on the Patent Act is concerned with substantive grounds of patentability."
Id. at 634. For this reason, she declined to join the majority opinion with regard to its
disposition of the question of when prosecution history estoppel arises.
163. Id. at 563.
164. Id. at 569.
165. Id. at 575.
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of the law regarding the scope of equivalents that is available when
prosecution history applies is 'unworkable.'""'
According to the majority, the flexible bar approach was unworkable because it was "virtually impossible to predict before the
decision on appeal where the line of surrender is drawn."'6 7 The
patentee would place the line of surrender very near the prior art
while the accused infringer would place the line much closer to the
language of the claims, limiting the possible range of equivalents.16
To the majority, this ambiguity was unacceptable. Rather, the
majority wanted to establish a rule that "can be relied upon to
produce consistent results and give rise to a body of law that
provides guidance to the marketplace on how to conduct its
affairs."'6 9 While "[aillowing some range of equivalents gives the
patentee some benefit of the doubt as to what was disclaimed," this
benefit "comes at the public's expense." 170 To the majority, the cost
of having a flexible bar was simply too steep.'
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 576.
171. Not all members of the Federal Circuit were pleased with the majority's bright-line
rule establishing a complete bar to a finding of equivalents for claim elements to which
prosecution history estoppel applies. Judge Michel, for instance, thought that the majority's
new rule constituted a "rejection of the policy advanced by the Supreme Court in WarnerJenkinson that the all-elements rule and prosecution history estoppel are sufficient to
balance the competing needs ofgranting meaningful protection to patentees and of notifying
the public of the effective scope of a patentee's claims." Id. at 598 (Michel, J., dissenting). To
Judge Michel, the majority's complete bar will, "in many cases, 'convert the protection of the
patent grant into a hollow and useless thing." Id. at 600 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.
v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)). The reason for this is that "anyone who
wants to steal a patentee's technology need only review the prosecution history to identify
patentability-related amendments, and then make a trivial modification to that part of its
product corresponding to an amended claim limitation." Id. at 600-01.
Like Judge Michel, Judge Rader was concerned about the unintended consequences of the
majority's complete bar. Judge Rader's focus, however, was on after-arising equivalents that
a patentee could not be expected to have anticipated when drafting the patent. "A primary
justification for the doctrine of equivalents is to accommodate after-arising technology.
Without a doctrine of equivalents, any claim drafted in current technological terms could
easily be circumvented after the advent of an advance in technology." Id. at 619 (Rader, J.,
dissenting). This complete bar effectively punishes the patentee for failing to predict
technological advancements when deciding how to amend a claim. "Because after-arising
technology was not in existence during the patent application process, the applicant could
not have known of it, let alone surrendered it." Id. at 620. By holding to the contrary, Judge
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C. Festo and the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
prosecution history estoppel applied to "every amendment made to
satisfy the requirements of the Patent Act" and whether "when
estoppel arises, it bars suit against every equivalent to the
amended claim element." 7 2 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Kennedy affirmed the reasoning behind the Federal Circuit's
holding that prosecution history estoppel arises for every narrowing amendment made to satisfy the Patent Act, but disagreed with
the Federal Circuit's per se rule against application of the doctrine
of equivalents to amended claim elements. 1"
Justice Kennedy disposed of the issue of whether prosecution
history estoppel arises for any amendment made to satisfy the
requirements of the Patent Act rather quickly by agreeing with the
Federal Circuit's disposition of the issue."7 4 Allaying fears that any
amendment would give rise to prosecution history estoppel, Justice
Kennedy noted that if an amendment "is truly cosmetic, then it
would not narrow the patent's scope or raise an estoppel." 17 5 If,
however, an "amendment is necessary and narrows the patent's
scope-even if only for the purpose of better description--estoppel
may apply. A patentee who narrows a claim as a condition for
obtaining a patent disavows his claim to the broader subject matter."176 Estoppel may arise in such a situation because courts "must
regard the patentee as having conceded an inability to claim the
or at least as having abandoned his right to
broader subject matter
" 177
appeal a rejection.
In reviewing the Federal Circuit's decision to apply a complete
bar to the application of the doctrine of equivalents to amended
claim elements, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the doctrine of
equivalents increases the uncertainty surrounding the exact scope
Rader argued, the majority has to "apply an estoppel where none exists and defeat the

doctrine of equivalents." Id.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002).
See id. at 730-42.
See id. at 736.
Id. at 736-37.
Id. at 737.
Id.
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of a patent claim and that it may be difficult to determine what is7
and what is not equivalent to an element of the patent claim. 1798
This ambiguity, however, is a cost necessary to spur innovation.
For this reason, each time the Court has considered the validity of
the doctrine of equivalents, the Court "has affirmed the doctrine
over dissents that urged a more certain rule."8 °
In Festo, Justice Kennedy criticized the reasoning behind the
Federal Circuit's decision to adopt a complete bar. First, the
adoption of a per se rule against the application of the doctrine of
equivalents to amended claim elements
is inconsistent with the purpose of applying the estoppel in the
first place-to hold the inventor to the representations made
during the application process and to the inferences that may
reasonably be drawn from the amendment. By amending the
application, the inventor is deemed to concede that the patent
does not extend as far as the original claim. It does not follow,
however, that the amended claim becomes so perfect in its
description that no one could devise an equivalent."8 '
In other words, the amendment "may demonstrate what the claim
is not; but it may still fail to capture precisely what the claim is."8 2
The ambiguities of language may prevent a patentee from ever
claiming precisely what the claim is. A better approach, according
to Justice Kennedy, was the approach long favored by the Supreme
Court; specifically, flexibly applying the doctrine of equivalents by
considering "what equivalents were surrendered during the prosecution of the patent, rather than imposing a complete bar that
resorts to the very literalism the equivalents rule is designed to
ls
overcome." 3
The Supreme Court also criticized the Federal Circuit's complete
bar because of the potential the per se rule has in disrupting the
expectations of inventors and inventive entities."' After all,
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 732.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737-38.
Id. at 738.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 739 (citations omitted).
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"[i] nventors who amended their claims under the previous regime
had no reason to believe they were conceding all equivalents. If
they had known, they might have appealed the rejection in181

stead."

Instead of a complete bar, the court erected a rebuttable presumption against a finding of equivalency for amended claim
elements. ' Justice Kennedy was quick to note that this "presumption is not ... just the complete bar by another name.""s" To rebut

this presumption, a patentee needs only to produce evidence
showing that the amendment did not disclaim a particular equivalent. Examples of this type of evidence include evidence that the
equivalent was unforeseeable as of the application date,'8 or that
the "rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than
a tangential relation to the equivalent in question,"""9 or "some
other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably
be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in
question.""g Upon such a showing, the patentee has met his
burden and is free to rely on the doctrine of equivalents to show
infringement. A finding of infringement in this manner produces
a fair and equitable result-the exact result the doctrine of equivalents was designed to produce.
V. A FESTo-LIKE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION FOR CASES SUCH AS
JOHNSON & JOHNSTON
A. The Supreme Court'sRationale for a Rebuttable Presumption

Implementation of a Festo-like rebuttable presumption to situations involving disclosed but unclaimed subject matter and alleged
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents would fulfill the
same policy objectives of fairness and equity as were present
in Festo. As such, this Part describes how the rationale utilized
by the Supreme Court in resolving Festo is easily analogized to
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
See id. at 741.
Id.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 741.
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Johnson & Johnston-type disputes, and why a Festo-like rebuttable
presumption should be the rule courts use when determining the
applicability of the doctrine of equivalents to infringement actions
involving disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.
Writing for the Supreme Court in Festo, Justice Kennedy noted:
If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their
value would be greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the patent,
and its value to inventors could be destroyed by the simple acts
of copying. For this reason, the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not
necessarily the most efficient rule. The scope of a patent is not
limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents
to the claims described. 191
While this language was directed to the issue of application of the
doctrine of equivalents to claim elements to which prosecution
history estoppel applied, the Court's reasoning easily could be
applied to the analogous situation of whether the doctrine of
equivalents is available to a patentee for disclosed but unclaimed
subject matter. Because a rebuttable presumption serves the
policy objectives of the prosecution history estoppel/doctrine of
equivalents dichotomy, a rebuttable presumption likewise should
serve the policies underlying the disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter/doctrine of equivalents dichotomy.
B. Johnson & Johnston Revisited
In Johnson & Johnston,the Federal Circuit was concerned that
application of the doctrine of equivalents to the disclosed but
unclaimed subject matter would allow a patentee to avoid scrutiny
at the Patent and Trademark Office for certain equivalents and
then rely on the doctrine of equivalents to enlarge the scope of the
patent. Indeed, in its per curiam opinion in Johnson & Johnston,
the Federal Circuit noted that one of the virtues of its rule was that
courts would "avoid the problem of extending the coverage of an
exclusive right to encompass more than that properly examined by
191. Id. at 731-32.
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the [Patent and Trademark Office]."' 9 2 This logic was evident in
Maxwell as well.19 In Maxwell, the Federal Circuit noted that
application of the doctrine of equivalents to disclosed but unclaimed subject matter would "merely encourage a patent applicant
to present a broad disclosure in the specification of the application
and file narrow claims, avoiding examination of broader claims
that the applicant could have filed consistent with the specification." 94 Such a situation would vitiate the notice function of the
claims and the Federal Circuit properly precluded such an occurrence.
C. Situations in Which Subject Matter Is Outside PatentScope
By holding that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to
rescue unclaimed subject matter disclosed in a specification, however, the Federal Circuit seemed to ignore the reality that a patentee may believe his patent encompasses all disclosed subject matter
only to learn later that some of the subject matter is deemed
outside the scope of the claims. This occurred, for instance, in
Graver Tank, and the majority in Johnson & Johnston was forced
to acknowledge that the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
equivalents could serve as a basis for a finding of infringement for
subject matter contained within claims that were judicially invalidated.' 95 Yet judicial invalidation is not the only mechanism by
which a patentee may learn that particular subject matter is
outside the scope of his patent. "A patentee could disclose multiple
embodiments, genuinely intending to claim them all. But during
litigation, the court unexpectedly construes the claim narrowly to
cover only one embodiment, despite the patentee's arguments to
the contrary.... The other embodiments are then considered disclosed but not claimed." 96 Because the Federal Circuit refuses to
consider the intent of the patentee, the patentee will be unable to
192. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(per curiam).
193. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
194. Id. at 1107.
195. See Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1053.
196. Joseph M. O'Malley, Jr. & Bruce M. Wexler, Battle Lines Form on MatterDisclosed
but Not Claimed,N.Y. L.J., May 13,2002, at 3, availableat http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/
outsidelinks/NYIJOMalleyWexlerArticle.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
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show infringement via the doctrine of equivalents as to these
suddenly unclaimed embodiments. This is true even if the Patent
and Trademark Office examined and issued the patent in light of
these embodiments. In this situation, there is no rationale for
arguing that the patentee skirted the examination process by
disclosing broadly and claiming narrowly. Equity would argue that
a judicial narrowing of the scope of a claim is equivalent to having
claims judicially invalidated, and as such, the doctrine of equivalents should be available to rescue these embodiments.
D. Settled Expectations of Patent Holders
Another problem with the Federal Circuit's rule in Johnson &
Johnston is that it upsets the expectations of patent holders.
"Indeed, it is hard to predict just how much subject matter in
existing patents might have just been dedicated to the public by
operation of the Johnson & Johnston decision."' 97 As the Supreme
Court noted in Festo, Warner-Jenkinson cautioned courts to be
careful before adopting changes that may disrupt the expectations
inventors have in their property.'98 Like Festo, it is apparent that
the Federal Circuit in Johnson & Johnston ignored this aspect of
Warner-Jenkinson.The logic of the Supreme Court in Festo is as
valid for disclosed but unclaimed subject matter as it is for claim
elements subject to prosecution history estoppel. In both situations,
case law influences patent prosecution'" and, like claim elements
subject to prosecution history estoppel, there is no compelling
reason for a new, more stringent rule against application of the
doctrine of equivalents to disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.
E. Application of a Festo-Like Rebuttable Presumption to Johnson
& Johnston-Type Disputes
Under a Festo-like rebuttable presumption against application
of the doctrine of equivalents to disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter, the delicate balance between the incentives given to
197. Id
198. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)
(citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997)).
199. Id.
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inventors and the notice function of patent claims is preserved. The
burden is placed squarely on the patentee to show that the patent
was examined in light of the disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter. A rebuttable presumption would prevent the patentee from
disclosing broadly and claiming narrowly, and it would not allow
the patentee to rescue subject matter that was inadvertently left
unclaimed, thereby vitiating the notice function of the claims. The
purpose of the doctrine of equivalents, after all, is not to save the
patentee from his own mistakes. Rather, it is to prevent others
from practicing a fraud on the patent.
In both Festo and Johnson & Johnston, the Federal Circuit was
preoccupied with notions of certainty and judicial economy. By
focusing primarily on the notice function of claims, the Federal
Circuit, in both cases, missed the more nuanced questions to which
its attention should have been focused. The Supreme Court in Festo
chastised the Federal Circuit for failing to consider the purpose of
the claim amendments and the actual subject matter surrendered
in making the amendments. 2" With respect to Johnson &
Johnston,the Federal Circuit should have focused on the extent to
which the examiner examined the patent in light of the disclosed
but unclaimed subject matter during prosecution, and on the
question of why the subject matter was left unclaimed. Answering
these questions requires a consideration of the vagaries of the
patent application process, and points to an equitable balance
between the interests of the patentee and society at large. As with
claim elements to which prosecution history estoppel applies, a
rebuttable presumption against application of the doctrine of
equivalents to disclosed but unclaimed subject matter allows a
court to strike this proper balance. A rebuttable presumption is the
better rule, and thus the one the Federal Circuit should use when
adjudicating Johnson & Johnston-typedisputes.
F. A HypotheticalExample
This Part presents an example of a situation where application
of a Festo-like rebuttable presumption would allow for a finding of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for disclosed but
200. See id. at 739-41.
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unclaimed subject matter. A patentee files an application in the
Patent and Trademark Office claiming a process utilizing a "fluorocarbon." Nowhere in the specification is the term "fluorocarbon"
explicitly defined. The patentee, however, discloses two embodiments of her invention. The first embodiment includes a partially
fluorinated hydrocarbon (e.g., a compound having the chemical
formula C 2H 4F 2), and the second embodiment includes a fully
fluorinated hydrocarbon (e.g., a compound having the chemical
formula C2F 6). During patent prosecution, the patent examiner
rejects the patentee's claims on grounds not related to use of the
term "fluorocarbon." In making the rejections, the patent examiner
cites patents utilizing both partially and fully fluorinated hydrocarbons. Responding to the rejections, the patentee makes arguments
and amends the claims. Satisfied that the application now contains
allowable subject matter, the patent examiner allows the application, and it issues as a U.S. patent.
Subsequent to the patent issuing, the patentee discovers that
one of her competitors is using her claimed process with a partially
fluorinated hydrocarbon. The patentee then files suit alleging
literal infringement or, alternatively, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. During a bench trial, the defendant claims
that he did not infringe the patent because the term "fluorocarbon"
exclusively refers to fully fluorinated hydrocarbons, and because of
this, the patentee dedicated the process utilizing a partially fluorinated hydrocarbon to the public. The defendant supports this
allegation with technical dictionaries, common dictionaries, and
testimony from experts in that technology area, all defining
the term "fluorocarbon" to mean a hydrocarbon in which all the
hydrogen molecules have been replaced with fluorine molecules.
The patentee counters this allegation by supplying technical and
common dictionary definitions that define "fluorocarbon" as a
hydrocarbon in which fluorine molecules have replaced some or all
of the hydrogen molecules. Additionally, the patentee submits an
affidavit from the patent examiner stating that during prosecution,
the patent examiner examined the patentee's application under the
assumption that the term "fluorocarbon" referred to both partially
and fully fluorinated hydrocarbons.
After hearing all the evidence, the trial judge makes two rulings.
First, he construes the term "fluorocarbon" to mean a fully fluori-
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nated hydrocarbon (e.g., C 2F 6 ), placing partially fluorinated hydrocarbons outside the scope of the patent claims. This means that the
defendant cannot have literally infringed the patent. Second, the
trial judge finds that for the purposes of the claimed process,
partially fluorinated hydrocarbons are equivalent to fully fluorinated hydrocarbons. These two rulings, thus, raise the question of
whether the process utilizing a partially fluorinated hydrocarbon
was dedicated to the public. If the process was not dedicated to the
public, the defendant infringed the patent under the doctrine of
equivalents.
Application of a Festo-like rebuttable presumption to this fact
pattern warrants the trial judge finding infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents for the following reasons. First, the specification includes examples of the claimed process utilizing both a
partially and a fully fluorinated hydrocarbon. This is evidence that
the patentee intended the term "fluorocarbon" to include both
partially and fully fluorinated hydrocarbons. Second, the patent
examiner admits, and there is no contrary evidence in the prosecution history, that the patent was examined under the assumption
that the claims covered both fully and partially fluorinated hydrocarbons. Third, the evidence of record in the trial shows that "fluorocarbon" has been defined to include both partially and fully
fluorinated hydrocarbons. In view of the totality of the evidence,
the patentee cannot reasonably be said to have intentionally
dedicated the process utilizing a partially fluorinated hydrocarbon
to the public. Nor does the evidence support a conclusion that the
patentee attempted to disclose broadly and claim narrowly to
prevent a rigorous examination of the process utilizing a partially
fluorinated hydrocarbon before the Patent and Trademark Office.
The sum total of this evidence, then, is enough to overcome the
rebuttable presumption against application of the doctrine of
equivalents to the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. This is
a fair and equitable result.
CONCLUSION

Until Congress decides to step into the fray, tension between
various doctrines in patent law will always exist. The need for
clarity and definiteness necessarily will be balanced against the

782

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:747

need to protect the patent as valuable incentive to create. Rules
that force courts to explicitly balance these competing policy
objectives will produce more equitable and just results than any
bright-line, per se rule that values one set of policy objectives over
another. The Supreme Court stated explicitly in Festo that a
rebuttable presumption, a flexible rule, is the preferred approach
to resolving disputes about whether a patentee surrendered a
particular equivalent when amending a claim for the purpose of
complying with the Patent Act. Because the policy objectives and
the rationale used to justify the Supreme Court's disposition of
Festo are the same as those present in disputes such as Johnson &
Johnston,the same rules should apply to both situations. As such,
courts should employ a rebuttable presumption against application
of the doctrine of equivalents to disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter rather than the per se rule the Federal Circuit articulated
in Johnson & Johnston. If the Federal Circuit is unwilling to
overrule Johnson & Johnston sua sponte, the Supreme Court
should step into the fray to overrule the Federal Circuit as it did in
Festo.
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